This study investigates whether, how and why industry performance can drive long-term return reversals. Using data from the UK, we find that firms in losing industries significantly outperform those in winning industries over the subsequent five years. These industry reversals remain strong and persistent after controlling for stock momentum, industry momentum, seasonal effects and traditional risk factors. We find a strong influence of past industry performance on stock return reversals. Our results also show that past industry performance is the driving force behind long-term reversals. Specifically, we find that industry components drive stock reversals, while past stock performance does not explain industry reversals. Further analysis suggests that industry reversals are present in both good and bad states of the economy and are stronger in industries with high valuation uncertainty. This implies that industry reversals are more likely to be a result of mispricing.
Introduction
show that loser stocks over the past three to five years outperform winners by 25% in the next three years. Many subsequent studies also report evidence of longterm reversals in major international equity markets.
1 Despite this evidence, the causes of these reversals are highly controversial in the literature. Prominent behavioural theories suggest that reversals occur due to investors' behavioural biases in forecasting firm growth (DeBondt and Thaler, 1987; Daniel et al., 1998; Barberis et al., 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999) . However, Klein (2001) and George and Hwang (2007) contend that reversals reflect investors' rational reactions to a delay in the payment of capital gains taxes. Rational asset pricing models also suggest that reversals represent compensation for risk French, 1993, 1996; Zhang, 2005; Liu, 2006) .
This study contributes to this ongoing debate by investigating whether, how and why industry performance can drive long-term return reversals. As firms in the same industry share similar fundamentals and are affected by common shocks, arising from shifts in demand and supply for their products, industry components can cause the returns of these firms to comove (e.g. Welch, 2004; Mackay and Philips, 2005) . The rational view of asset pricing suggests that this comovement represents industry-specific risk.
Theoretical asset pricing models demonstrate that a firm's risk and return can be a function of its industry characteristics (e.g. Berk et al., 1999; Calson et al., 2004 Calson et al., , 2014 Peress, 2010; Bustamante, 2015) . 2 Consistent with this theoretical prediction, several empirical studies document that industry components can explain asset pricing regularities (e.g. Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999; Hou and Robinson, 2006; Hameed and Mian, 2015) . Kogan (2001) , Zhang (2005) and Hou et al. (2015) show that firms have greater investment adjustment costs in downturn industries and the potential risk associated with having irreversible investments in place can cause higher returns for firms operating in poorly performing industries than for those in well performing industries. The models of Fama and French (1997) and Cohen et al. (2003) also indicate that poor past performance represents distress risk and firms in losing industries are, therefore, expected to offer higher returns to their shareholders for bearing industry distress risk.
Market frictions and investors' irrational behaviour can also induce industry components in stock returns. Barberis et al. (2005) and Peng and Xiong (2006) argue that 1 E.g. Chou et al. (2007) in Japan, Clare and Thomas (1995) in the UK and George and Hwang (2007) in the US. 2 Fama and French (1997) find that neither the Sharp-Linter-Black capital asset pricing model (CAPM) nor their three-factor model can precisely estimate industry costs of equity. Lewellen et al. (2010) show that macroeconomic (e.g. consumption, consumption-to-wealth, and investment-to-growth) based asset pricing models fail to explain cross-sectional returns for industry portfolios.
investors allocate funds at a category rather than individual stock level. If these category investors are noise traders with correlated sentiment, their coordinated demand may cause excess comovement in the returns of stocks in the same category. Barberis et al. (2005) also argue that investors trade only a subset of securities. When these investors' risk aversion, sentiment, or liquidity needs change, they alter their exposure to the securities in their habitat, thereby causing comovement beyond fundamentals. If an industry represents a category or a habitat, the coordinated demand of noise traders at the industry level can generate industry components that are unrelated to firm fundamentals.
The behavioural models proposed by Daniel et al. (1998) , Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) suggest that these industry components may drive long-term return reversals. In Daniel et al.'s model, investors exhibit overconfidence and self-attribution biases.
The degree of investors' overconfidence and self-attribution may vary over time and across industries, causing mispricing and subsequent reversals. For example, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) argue that the difficulty in assessing the value of new or changing industries promotes overconfidence among investors who are related to these industries. They also argue that investors' conservatism bias can reduce the speed at which investors update their priors about new and changing industries. In Barberis et al.'s (1998) model, investors exhibit representativeness bias, causing them to become too optimistic (pessimistic) about firms with a sequence of good (bad) news. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) argue that if investors focus more on industry than firm specific news, the representativeness bias can lead them to extrapolate performance too far from the industry as a whole, yielding long-term reversals.
Finally, several studies show that analysts and institutional investors have more industry-and market-wide information than firm-specific information (e.g. Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Irvine and Pointiff, 2009; Peress, 2010) . As analysts and institutional investors usually pay more attention to industry leaders, the prices of these leaders will reflect market-and industrywide news more quickly than those of their followers. Similarly, industries with more analysts and institutional holdings are shown to incorporate market-wide news faster than other industries (e.g. Hong et al., 2007) . When traders seek to exploit sluggish price adjustments to industry-or market-wide information, they can create excess industry momentum and subsequent industry reversals may happen as prices revert back to their equilibrium levels (e.g.
Hong and Stein, 1999).
Given the above arguments, it is surprising that little attention is given to the industry reversals and their role in explaining stock reversals. This study fills the gap. Using stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), we find significant long-term industry reversals in the UK market. Specifically, we show that stocks in losing industries outperform those in winning industries over the subsequent five years after controlling for stock momentum, industry momentum, seasonal patterns and traditional risk factors. We also show that industry reversals are much stronger than stock reversals. In particular, we find that industry reversals are present in all calendar months, in neutral (neither winner nor loser) stocks and after adjusting for past stock performance. However, stock reversals exhibit strong seasonal patterns, are non-existent in neutral (neither winning nor losing) industries and disappear when adjusting for past industry performance. This evidence supports the prediction that industry components are the main driving force behind long-term return reversals.
In the subsequent analysis, we also investigate whether the long-term industry reversals are consistent with rational explanations or are a result of mispricing. To this end, we investigate whether stock and industry reversals survive after stringent risk adjustments. By using both the French (1993, 2015) three-and five-factor model 3 , we find that stock reversals completely disappear, while industry reversals remain positive and significant, albeit weak in the five-factor model. Since industry reversals are not fully explained by risk factors, it is plausible that mispricing is also at play. To shed further light on this issue, we compare the performance of the industry contrarian strategies in different states of the economy. Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that, if loser stocks are fundamentally riskier than winner stocks, then contrarian strategies should be profitable only in good states, as the high marginal utility of wealth in bad states makes loser stocks unattractive to risk-averse investors. However, if industry reversals represent a form of market inefficiency, one would expect them to be more pronounced in industries with high information uncertainty (see, e.g., Hirshleifer et al., 2013) .
We find that the profits of industry contrarian strategies exist in both good and bad states of the economy and are higher in industries with less competition, high accruals, high idiosyncratic volatility and low analyst coverage. 4 These findings suggest that industry reversals are more likely to represent mispricing rather than compensation for risk.
This study contributes to the literature in many ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study long-term industry reversals and their impact on the welldocumented long-term stock reversals. Our study is related to the work of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) , who document strong industry components in the short-term stock momentum anomaly. However, while several studies argue that short-term momentum and long-term reversals are related (Hong and Stein, 1998; Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001) , others show that they are two independent phenomena (George and Hwang, 2004) 5 . Thus, whether industry reversals have an impact on stock reversals remains an open empirical question. In this study, we document the presence of strong industry reversals, which fully subsume the stock reversals. This finding has important implications for the asset pricing literature.
Specifically, while several early studies show that contemporaneous industry returns have little impact on stock returns (e.g. Fama and French, 1997; Heston and Rouwenhorst, 1994; Griffin and Karolyi, 1998) , we find that past industry performance strongly affects future stock returns.
Second, we investigate whether the importance of industry returns in the conditional asset pricing is consistent with rational expectations or is better explained by behavioural biases. We find that industry reversals are more consistent with behavioural explanations and represent a challenge to the rational asset pricing models. Third, we evaluate the ability of the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model to explain anomalies outside the US. Using data from the UK, we find that the five-factor model fully explains the stock return reversals, but its ability to explain industry reversals is relatively limited. Finally, the institutional setting of the UK market provides a unique opportunity to test the role of taxes in long-term return reversals. George and Hwang (2007) show that stock reversals in the US come exclusively in January.
Since the UK tax year end is 5 April, investigating stock reversals in the month of April helps us understand whether the strong January reversals in the US are caused by tax loss selling or are merely the turn-of-the-year effect. Consistent with the tax loss selling argument, we find that stock reversals in the UK are particularly strong in April. However, the finding that industry reversals are not confined to the months of January or April is inconsistent with the tax loss selling hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the methodology. Section 3 provides summary statistics. Section 4 provides empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
Data, variables and methodology

Sample data
5 Hwang (2004, 2007) show that the momentum captured by the nearness of a stock's price to its 52-week high does not reverse in the long term. 
Methodology
Following George and Hwang (2004 , 2007 , 2010 and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) , we use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) style regression to measure and compare returns to different long-term investment strategies. This approach has the advantage of isolating the performance of a particular investment strategy from other factors that could affect returns. It also allows us to assess the performance of the long-term investment strategies across different investment horizons.
If an investor forms portfolios of winners and losers every month and holds these portfolios for the next T months, the return earned in a given month t is the equal-weighted average of the returns to T portfolios, each formed in one of the past T months t-j (for j=1 to T). 11 Thus, the contribution of the portfolio formed in month t-j to the month-t return can be estimated by the following cross-sectional regression: 
where Rit is the return to stock i in month t; sizei,t-1 is the log of market capitalisation; Ri,t-1 is the previous month's return; BMi,t-1 is the past month's book-to-market ratio; and the remaining eight dummy variables are as defined earlier. The variable sizei,t-1, Ri,t-1 and BMi,t-1 are expressed as deviations from their cross-sectional means and are included in the regression to control for the size effect, the bid-ask bounce and the book-to-market effect, respectively 12 .
The intercept 0 jt b is the return to the risk-neutral portfolio that was formed in month t-j and has hedged out the effects of average size, bid-ask bounce, book-to-market, momentum and long-term winners and losers in predicting returns. The total month-t returns involve portfolios formed over the prior 60 months (see George and Hwang, 2007 Table 1 reports the basic characteristics of the 20 industry portfolios. The average percentage of total market capitalisation, the five-year raw return, and the five-year excess market return are the time-series means of the cross-sectional industry averages in each month. The five-year raw returns are calculated from the five-year value-weighted industry return indices, and the five-year market excess returns are calculated from the five-year industry raw returns minus the five-year FTSE All Share market index returns. In terms of the relative market capitalisations, the banking sector has the highest market share (of around 20%), while the automobiles and parts industry has the lowest number of firms and the lowest market share (of only 0.79%). The average five-year raw and the market excess returns vary considerably across industries, ranging from 0.73% (telecommunications) to -0.48% (others). Table 1 and Table 2 about here Table 2 ) and 5-year winner (loser) suggests these similarities are maintained after adjusting for past stock performance. However, the negative correlation between 5-year winner Excess (5-year loser Excess ) and 5-year winning (losing) Ind implies that the similarities disappear after adjusting for past industry performance. These findings highlight the importance of taking industry past performance into consideration when defining long-term winners and losers.
Summary statistics
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Insert----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Results
Identifying long-term industry reversals
We first estimate Eq.
(1) to investigate the presence of long-term industry reversals after controlling for other variables that could affect returns. George and Hwang (2007) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) find that the outperformance of losers over winners is significantly weaker outside January. They conclude that long-term reversals are driven by tax loss selling at the tax year end. Since the UK tax year end is 5 April, we report the results separately with January and April included and with these two months excluded. This separation allows us to account for both the turn-of-the-year and the tax loss selling effects in the reversals. Table 3 reports the results for the entire five-year period (columns (11) and (12)) and the five individual holding periods (columns (1) to (10)). Table 3 about here
The key variables in Table 3 are 5year winning Ind., 5year losing Ind., 5-year winner
and 5-year loser. In column (11), losing industries and loser stocks experience significant positive returns of 0.27% (t-statistic=3.86) and 0.11% (t-statistic=2.07) per month, respectively, over the five-year period. Column (12) shows that the return on loser stocks loses its significance, whereas the return on losing industries remains significantly positive (0.30% per month), after the exclusion of January and April. This indicates that the significantly positive returns on loser stocks come exclusively from January and April, while stocks in losing industries experience positive returns across all calendar months.
Columns (1) to (10) (4), (6) and (8) show that the returns on loser stocks are not statistically significant outside January and April. This finding suggests that the returns on loser stocks have strong seasonal patterns, consistent with George and Hwang (2007) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) .
In the last three rows, we evaluate stock and industry contrarian performance. Over the five-year period, losing industries significantly outperform winning industries by 0.29%
per month (column (11)). This outperformance remains significant after the exclusion of January and April (column (12)). The industry contrarian spread is statistically significant from the second to the fifth year. Column (11) also suggests that the return on loser stocks is significantly higher (0.12% per month) than that of winner stocks. However, this return difference becomes insignificant when January and April are excluded. Thus, the outperformance of loser stocks over winner stocks is confined to January and April, while stocks in losing industries have persistently and significantly higher returns than those in winning industries across all months. In terms of economic significance, our results suggest that the industry contrarian spread is at least two times greater than the stock contrarian spread (e.g. 0.29% against 0.12% in column (12)). We also find that losing industries are the main contributor to the industry contrarian spread, consistent with the limits to arbitrage argument (see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Stambaugh et al., 2012) .
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The institutional setting of the UK market provides us with a unique opportunity to test the role of taxes in explaining long-term return reversals. Unlike that in the US, the UK tax year ends on 5 April. The calendar month of April allows us to test the hypothesis that tax loss selling is fully responsible for loser stock reversals (e.g. George and Hwang, 2007; Klein, 13 See Section 4.5.4 for further discussion.
1999).
14 Lakonishok et al. (1991) , Sias and Starks (1997) and Ng and Wang (2004) argue that, when the calendar year end is approaching, institutional investors "dress" up their portfolios by selling stocks with poor past performance in order to impress their clients with their stockpicking skills. 15 The selling pressure depresses the prices of loser stocks in December. When the pressure eases in January, the prices revert back to equilibrium and losers will have higher returns. Thus, if this "window dressing" is exclusive to the calendar year end, returns in April are more likely to provide a clean test of the tax loss selling hypothesis. We regress the contrarian spreads on January and April dummy variables. In untabulated results, the January and April dummies are positively and significantly associated with the stock contrarian spread, but none of these dummies can explain the industry contrarian spread. 16 These findings imply that stock reversals can be attributed, at least partly, to tax loss selling or the turn-of-the-year, but industry reversals are independent of these effects.
The remaining variables in Table 3 are included as controls in Eq.
(1). The significantly negative coefficient on ,1 it R  is consistent with the month-by-month return reversals discovered
by Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) . The lagged book-to-market ratio exhibits a positive relationship with stock returns. The stock momentum effect measured by the price relative to the 52-week high (George and Hwang, 2004 ) is much stronger than the industry momentum effect (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999). 
Comparisons between industry and stock reversals
In this section, we evaluate the relative strength of stock and industry reversals. We first search for industry reversals among neutral (neither loser nor winner) stocks. Then, we examine whether stock reversals exist in stocks with neutral industry performance. The results are reported in Table 4 , without control variables for the sake of brevity. Table 4 about here
The two interactions The tax loss selling hypothesis states that investors seek to reduce their taxes by realising losses at the tax year end, thereby depressing stock prices. Stock prices revert back to their equilibrium levels in the first month of the new tax year, causing higher returns. 15 The window dressing effect also affects short-term momentum, as momentum profits are significantly lower in January than other calendar months (e.g. Jagadeesh and Titman, 1993; Sias and Starks, 1997) . 16 These results are available upon request. 17 We also use past 12-month returns to identify momentum winners and losers in Eq.(1). Our main results of long-term industry reversals remain unchanged. These results are available upon request. stocks within losing industries have significantly positive returns over the five-year period and across the last four holding periods. However, the returns on neutral stocks within winning industries are not significant, except for the fifth year (column 5), where the return is negative (-0.22% per month) and weakly significant (t-stat =-1.77). This lack of significance is in line with our earlier results that losing industries are the main source of industry reversals. The last two rows in Panel A show the presence of industry contrarian performance in stocks with neutral performance. Specifically, neural stocks in losing industries outperform their counterparts in winning industries by 0.29% per month over the 5-year period. In the five individual holding periods, the industry contrarian spreads are significantly positive from the third to the fifth year (columns (2) to (5)). These findings suggest that industry reversals are not confined to stocks with extreme past performance. Table 4 provides the results on whether stock contrarian performance exists in stocks with neutral industry performance. Column (6) shows that in industries with neutral performance, winner and loser stocks do not exhibit significant returns over the 5-year period.
Panel B in
The returns on winner and loser stocks are also not significant in the individual holding periods, except in the fourth year. The last two rows show that in industries with neutral performance, the return to a zero-investment strategy of longing loser stocks and shorting winner stocks is not significant for both the 5-year period and the individual holding periods. In contrast to the results in Panel A, this evidence implies that extreme performance of stocks from neutral industries does not generate significant contrarian profits.
Adjusting for past performance
While the previous section focuses on the relative strength of stock and industry reversals, this section investigates whether past stock or past industry performance is the main driving force behind long-term reversals. Specifically, we adjust stock and industry reversals for past industry and past stock performance, respectively, to identify which type of reversal survives the adjustment. Table 5 about here
We first investigate whether stock reversals exist after accounting for past industry performance. Recall that the dummy variable 5 year winner Excess (5 year loser Excess ) is set to unity for 30% of stocks with highest (lowest) industry-adjusted returns. We refer to these dummies as excess industry portfolios and the returns on these portfolios are shown in Panel A of Table 5 . Column (6) shows that the return to the loser excess industry portfolio over the five-year period is not significant. This portfolio's return is only significantly positive (0.15% per month) in the fourth year (column (4)). The last two rows in Panel A provide much stronger evidence that past industry performance drives stock reversals. The contrarian returns between the two excess industry portfolios are not significant. The disappearance of stock reversals after adjusting for past industry performance implies that industry components are the main source of contrarian profits.
Our previous results suggest that stock reversals disappear after adjusting for the industry effect. Here, we investigate whether the reverse is true. If industry reversals exist and are independent of stock reversals, then industry reversals should not disappear after adjusting for past stock performance. The two dummy variables 5year winning Ind Excess and 5year losing Ind Excess are specifically designed to account for the impact of past stock performance on industry reversals. We refer to these two dummies as excess stock portfolios. The returns on these portfolios are reported in Panel B.
Column (6) shows that, over the five-year period, the losing industry excess stock portfolio has a significant positive return of 0.16%. This return is smaller than that in Table 4 (i.e. 0.27%), suggesting that past stock performance only plays a partial role in the reversals for losing industries. The returns on the losing industry excess stock portfolio are also significantly positive in the third and the fifth year. The last two rows in Panel B show that the contrarian return between the two industry excess stock portfolios is significantly positive over the five-year period as well as in the second and fifth years. However, the significance level is slightly lower than that reported in Table 4 .
In untabulated results, we also investigate whether the outperformance of losing over winning industries is a within-industry effect. We rank stocks in each industry on their past 5-year performance and define the 30% highest (lowest) performing stocks as the within-industry winners (losers). We find that the contrarian performance of buying within-industry losers and selling within-industry winners is not significant, implying that long-term industry reversals are not a within-industry phenomenon.
In summary, this section shows that past industry performance is the driving force behind long-term reversals and these reversals are not a within-industry phenomenon.
Are long-term industry reversals driven by risk or mispricing?
Risk-adjusted returns
This section examines whether stock and industry reversals are attributable to risk exposures.
Each coefficient in the Fama-MacBeth regressions (Eq. (1)) is a time-series average of sums (e.g. 7t S and 8t S in Section 2.3) of monthly raw returns to a particular portfolio strategy. We first estimate the risk-adjusted return on a particular strategy by running a time-series regression of the strategy's sums on the Fama-French (1993) factor realizations. 18 We then report the intercepts (risk-adjusted returns) for the strategy in Table 6 . Table 6 about here
Panel A shows that neither winner nor loser stocks have significant returns over the five-year period. The economic magnitude of the loser stocks' reversals is negligible (only 0.05% per month with a t-statistic of 0.86) (see column (6)). The stock contrarian performance is also insignificant in the five individual holding periods. However, the returns on losing industries and the industry contrarian performance remain positive and significant. Thus, although the cross-sectional analysis in Table 4 shows the co-existence of stock and industry reversals, only industry reversals remain significant after the Fama-French three-factor risk adjustments.
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Recent asset pricing studies (e.g. Novy-Marx, 2013; French, 2006, 2008; Titman et al., 2004) show that firm fundamentals, beyond those in the Fama and French (1996) model, predict stock returns. Building upon the discounted cash flow model, two additional factors, namely investment and profitability, are introduced to explain cross-sectional stock returns (Fama and French, 2015; Hou et al, 2015) . To re-evaluate contrarian profits, we use the 18 We are grateful to Gregory et al. (2013) for providing the UK Fama-French factors on their website, http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/files/ 19 Our risk adjustments are the same as the procedure of Fama and French (1996) . We first estimate the portfolios' returns based on Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions, in which we use all sample stocks (not just winners or losers) and are able to hedge out the effect of size, momentum (e.g. from both stocks and industries), and bid-ask bounce (or monthly reversals) to isolate monthly returns attributable only to whether a stock belongs to stock-or industrypast performance portfolios. This first procedure ensures that the second one, which assesses the significance of risk-adjusted returns to the portfolios of interest, produces powerful tests. To further justify the risk adjustment procedure, we follow George and Hwang (2007) and regress the intercepts (e.g. ) in Eq(1) on the Fama-French three-factor model. The intercepts from these Fama and French regressions are interpreted as the risk-adjusted returns to the neutral portfolios (i.e. portfolios that hedge out the bid-ask bounce, size, book-tomarket, momentum and long-term returns for winner-loser stocks and winning and losing industries). The intercepts of the Fama and French regressions are insignificant across all investment horizons, suggesting that the Fama and French factors do a good job explaining the returns to neutral portfolios. This evidence confirms that the risk adjustment procedure used in this study is well specified.
Fama and French five-factor model (Fama and French, 2015) In untabulated results, we find that the loading on the value factor for the five-year industry contrarian spread is positive, while those on the size and market factors are negative in both the three-and five-factor models. This implies that, relative to a neutral portfolio, the industry contrarian portfolio has low market risk and tends to be heavily weighted towards big firms (which makes sense because large firms are the main contributors to industry performance) and value stocks (as losing industries' market value has decreased and book-tomarket is large). In the five-factor model, the loadings on the investment and profitability factors are positive and negative, respectively. This suggests that industry contrarian profits come mainly from firms with low profitability (poor earnings may lead to poor performance) and those with fewer investment opportunities (firms in losing industries may find it difficult to expand their business). These findings suggest that industry contrarian returns are related to firm fundamentals.
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However, does the above evidence mean that industry reversals are a risk premium?
We argue that this may not necessarily be the case. First, even though one third of industrycontrarian performance disappears (0.27% vs. 0.19% per month) after controlling for the Fama and French five factors, the returns on losing industries remain significantly positive over the five-year period and the contrarian performance continues to be significant in some of the 20 The statistical significance of the returns in columns (4) and (5) disappears when January and April are excluded. 21 We also undertake an event study approach to investigate whether time-varying betas and factor loadings can explain the positive returns to losing industries (e.g. Ball and Kothari, 1989) . Generally, we find that the loadings on the value and investment factors have significantly increased in the post-event period. However, even after controlling for the changes in the loadings, stocks in losing industries still have significantly positive abnormal returns. These results are available upon request.
individual holding periods. This means that the mispricing explanation cannot be ruled out.
Second, Fama and French (2015) note that, as investment and profitability are two elements in the discounted cash flow model, the return prediction is the same whether the price is rational or irrational. Therefore, the loadings on the investment and profitability factors cannot be interpreted directly as risk exposures. Hou et al. (2015, p. 34 ) made a similar argument in stating that "… we wish to emphasize that the q-factor model is silent about the debate between rational asset pricing and mispricing. This interpretation is somewhat weaker than the risk factors interpretation per French (1993, 1996) ."
Sharpe ratio analysis
The reduction of industry reversals in the five-factor model would be consistent with the riskbased explanation, if the five-factor model were a rational asset pricing model. However, the debate on whether the five-factor model captures risk or mispricing is still ongoing. anomalies are bounded by the plausibility of the (squared) Sharpe ratio of the tangency portfolio that they imply. As such, the mean-variance efficient combination of the factors should have a Sharpe ratio greater than or equal to the maximum Sharpe ratio from anomalies. Table 7 reports Sharpe ratios for the three-factor model, the five-factor model, and the longshort contrarian portfolios. The monthly Sharpe ratio for each individual factor is calculated as the mean factor return divided by its standard deviation. Following MacKinlay (1995), we also estimate the maximum Sharpe ratio achievable from a given factor model as
, where f  is the vector of mean factor returns and f V is the variance-covariance matrix of the factor returns. Table 7 about here
Panel A shows that the value and investment factors in the five-factor model have the highest Sharpe ratios of 0.10 and 0.25, respectively. The Sharpe ratio of the five-year industry contrarian performance is 0.13, which is greater than that of the MKT, SMB and HML in the three-factor model. However, the Sharpe ratio of the five-year stock contrarian performance is nearly the same as the HML factor (0.10). Panel B shows that the three-factor model produces a maximum Sharpe ratio (0.15) that is lower than that of the industry contrarian performance (0.25), but greater than that of the stock contrarian performance (0.13). The tangency portfolio implied by the three-factor model encompasses the maximum risk-reward trade-off generated by the stock contrarian performance, which is consistent with the risk-based explanation. In contrast, the risk-return relationship in the three-factor model suggests that the industry contrarian performance is likely to be a mispricing effect. The Sharpe ratios associated with the stock and industry contrarian performance in the three-factor model are significant at the 5% level or better. 22 For the five-factor model, the maximum achievable Sharpe ratio is 0.29, which is greater than the Sharpe ratio associated with the industry contrarian performance and the three-factor model. Consistent with the previous results, the five-factor model is possibly more effective in explaining industry contrarian performance than its three-factor counterpart.
However, the profitability and investment factors in the five-factor model do not necessarily represent risk (Fama and French, 2015; Hou et al., 2015) . This is because comovement of stocks with similar profitability or investment opportunities does not contradict the mispricing effect. For instance, if investors have similar bias in processing earnings information, as modelled by Hirshleifer et al. (2011) , returns on stocks with similar profitability will also comove. Hence, investors' imperfect rationality and firm fundamentals can jointly generate the predictive power of profitability for returns. Furthermore, MacKinlay (1995) argues that the maximum Sharpe ratio for the three-factor model is too high to be consistent with rational asset pricing. We show that the maximum Sharpe ratio of the five-factor model (0.298) is even higher. This implies that the five-factor model may capture some elements of mispricing in stock returns and therefore we cannot fully rule out the mispricing effect in the industry contrarian performance. 
State of the economy
Our previous results show that although fundamental-related risks have explained some portion of industry contrarian performance, a considerable proportion of the positive returns on losing 22 Under the null hypothesis that the factor risk premiums are jointly equal to zero, [(T-N) /N]SSR is distributed as a central F(N, T-N), where N is the number of portfolios, T is the number of time-series observations and SSR is the squared Sharpe ratio (for details, see MacKinlay (1995) and Brennan et al. (1998) ).
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The maximum Sharpe ratios for the three-and four-factor models are 0.21 and 0.41 in US markets, as reported by Hou et al. (2015) . The four-factor model is based on the q-theory without the value factor. Hou et al. (2015) argue that the value effect is captured by the profitability and investment factors. We find that the value factor plays an important role in explaining industry-contrarian performance. Without the value factor in the five-factor model, industry-contrarian profits are significantly positive at the 5% level. Hou et al. (2015) argue that the maximum Sharpe ratio for their four-factor model is not too high (0.41) compared with the maximum Sharpe ratio of 1.6, which is estimated by factors containing 28 anomalies.
industries are left unexplained, suggesting a possible mispricing effect. To investigate this issue, we undertake a nonparametric approach similar to that of Lakonishok et al. (1994) . The risk-based argument says that, if losing industries are riskier than winning industries, the former should outperform the latter particularly in good states of the economy. However, there should be no contrarian performance in bad states of the economy, in which the marginal utility of wealth is high, making the risky losing industries unattractive to risk-averse investors. To test this prediction, we examine the consistency of the performance of the industry contrarian strategies across different states of the economy. The profits of these strategies are estimated from Eq.(1).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 8 
about here ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first approach examines industry contrarian performance during extremely bad times. Our sample period includes three waves of UK economic recessions, which are defined as negative GDP growth in two consecutive quarters as reported by the Office of National Statistics (ONS). We define the rest of the sample period as "other times". Panel A of Table 8 reports the results. In the first two waves of recessions ( (1994), we also evaluate the industry contrarian performance across four states of the economy, according to the overall market performance, using the equally weighted market return. 24 The four states are the 25 worst stock return months, the remaining 149 negative return months, the 184 positive months other than the 25 best, and the best 25 months in the sample. Panel B
provides the results. The first two columns show that industry contrarian strategies are profitable when the overall market experiences the worst and best performance. The evidence that industry contrarian performance also happens in bad states of the economy contradicts the risk-based explanation, suggesting that losing industries are not riskier than winning industries.
Valuation uncertainty
24 Note that using real GDP growth to define the states of the economy does not affect our conclusions. Further details of these results are available upon request.
Previous studies show that stocks with a great amount of valuation uncertainty, which makes arbitrage risky, costly and limited, are likely to be mispriced (e.g. Merton, 1987; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Lam and Wei, 2011) . The uncertainty can rise from a poor information environment, which can be a barrier to fair valuation of firms. Thus, if long-term industry reversals are due to mispricing, the reversals should be more pronounced for stocks from industries with high informational opacity. We use four proxies for valuation uncertainty, namely accruals, idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), competitiveness and analyst coverage.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 9 about here ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accruals are important accounting information which should be used by investors to adjust operating cash flows and earnings. However, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and Sloan (1996) find that investors have limited resources to incorporate accruals into the share valuation process. Hirshleifer et al. (2009) show that industry-based accruals can also predict future returns for industry portfolios, implying that accruals can be a barrier to the proper valuation of industries. We define accruals in the same way as Sloan (1996) . We aggregate the accrual elements at the industry level to obtain the industry accrual ratio. 25 Then, in June of each year, we rank industries by their accrual ratios and use the median accrual ratio to define high and low accrual industries from July of this year to June of next year. Finally, we repeat the FamaMacBeth regressions (Eq.(1)) for stocks in high and low accrual industries. If industry contrarian performance is a mispricing effect, we expect industry reversals to be more pronounced in industries with high accruals. Panel A of Table 9 reports the average monthly returns across the entire five-year period. It shows that the industry contrarian strategy is profitable only in high accrual industries, consistent with the mispricing effect.
IVOL is also widely used as a proxy for informational opacity. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) use IVOL as a measure of information asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders. West (1988) and Kelly (2014) document a negative association between price informativeness and IVOL. In the context of industries, industry IVOL would indicate how well industry portfolios absorbed industry-and market-wide information. Boutchkova et al. 25 The accruals are defined as Sloan, 1996) Competition across industries provides another important informational channel for investors to value stocks. Because firms in more concentrated industries can exercise significant pricing power on their products, they tend to disclose less information to the public, obscuring the fair value of stocks (e.g. Gal-Or, 1985; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Ali et al., 2014) . On the other hand, firms in more competitive industries can attract a great amount of attention from investors, who will demand more information from analysts (e.g. Kross et al., 1990; Lys and Soo, 1995; Das et al., 1998; Barth et al., 2001 ). As such, firms have more incentives to supply information to analysts in more competitive industries. Thus, the mispricing effect would predict a higher industry contrarian spread in more concentrated industries. We measure industry concentration using the Herfindahl index. Our final proxy for informational opacity is the number of analysts following. The role of financial analysts in disseminating information in financial markets has been widely documented (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Admati, 1985; Bhushan, 1989) . Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and Chan and Hameed (2006) report that analyst activities help impound both industry and market relevant information into stock prices. This implies that industry contrarian performance should be weaker in industries with more analysts. We collect the number of analysts following each firm in June of each year. According to each stock's industry membership, the number of analysts is aggregated in a given industry and then divided by the total number of firms in the industry. 27 We define the top (bottom) 10 industries as high (low) analyst coverage industries from July of one year to June of the next. We run the Fama- Securities with highly subjective valuations are risky and costly to arbitrage and therefore are likely to be affected by sentiment (see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Stambaugh et al., 2012) . In this study, we find that the valuation uncertainty, measured by accruals, idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), competitiveness and analyst coverage, is significantly higher in losing than winning industries. 28 This suggests that stocks in losing industries are more difficult to value and riskier and costlier to arbitrage than their counterparts in winning industries. Because of the limits to arbitrage, stocks in losing industries should be more affected by sentiment and their returns are more likely to reverse in the long run.
Overall, we show that the contrarian spreads are only significant in industries with high valuation uncertainty and these findings are robust to various risk-adjustment techniques.
Conclusion
This study investigates the role of past industry performance in predicting future stock returns in the UK market. We find that firms in losing industries significantly outperform those in 27 The data for analyst coverage is extracted from the Bloomberg database. The sample period is from 1997 to 2011. We also use the aggregated number of analysts at the industry level to define high and low analyst coverage industries. The results are similar to those produced when using the number of analysts per firm in a given industry. 28 These results are available upon request.
winning industries over the subsequent five years. These industry reversals remain strong and persistent after controlling for stock momentum, industry momentum, seasonal effects and traditional risk factors. We also find a strong industry influence on stock return reversals when we condition industry returns on past performance. Furthermore, we compare industry reversals with the stock reversals generated from individual stocks' past performance. We find that stock reversals come exclusively in January and April, consistent with the tax loss selling hypothesis. However, the absence of seasonal patterns in industry reversals does not support the tax-based explanation. Further analysis suggests that past industry performance is the main determinant of stock reversals. However, past stock performance cannot explain industry reversals. The overall results suggest that past industry performance contains salient information about long-term stock returns. Next, we investigate whether industry reversals are driven by risk or are a result of mispricing. We show that industry contrarian performance appears in both good and bad states of the economy, inconsistent with the risk-based explanation. We also find that industry contrarian performance is more prominent in industries with high valuation uncertainty, consistent with the mispricing effect.
Our results have several important implications. First, we show that industries play an important role in conditional asset pricing. Specifically, while previous studies show that contemporaneous industry returns have a negligible impact on stock returns (e.g., Fama and French, 1997; Heston and Rouwenhorst, 1994; Griffin and Karolyi, 1998) , we find that past industry performance affects future stock returns. Second, we highlight the importance of industry components in explaining stock reversals and show that the contrarian profits are more likely to represent mispricing than risk. Finally, our study suggests that investors are better off exploiting contrarian profits by focusing on industry portfolios. Table 2 Correlation matrix for long term reversal variables
The table is a correlation matrix for long term reversal variables and reports time-series means of cross-sectional correlations in each month. The variables in the matrix are various winner and loser identities according to individual stock and industry past performance and their interactions. 5-year winner (5-year loser) is a long term stock performance dummy that takes the value of 1 if a stock i's past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t, and zero otherwise. 5-year winning Ind. (5-year losing Ind.) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and losing industry in month t, and zero otherwise. Long term winning and losing industry are defined as the top and bottom three industries ranked on five-year value-weighted average industry returns. 5
Excess year Winner
( 5
Excess year Loser
) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a stock i's industry adjusted five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t, and zero otherwise. The industry adjusted five-year return is calculated as the stock's own five-year return minus the value-weighed five-year return for the industry to which the stock belongs. Conversely, we re-define winning and losing industries in terms of excess stock returns. All stocks are first placed into quintile portfolios according to the stock five-year performance measure. The excess stock return is a stock's five-year return minus the value-weighted five-year return of the quintile portfolio to which the stock belongs. For each o industry, we then average the excess stock returns according to each stock's industry membership. We choose top and bottom 3 portfolios as new winning and losing industries based on each industry's excess stock returns. If a stock belongs to the winning (losing) industries, the dummy 5 
R is the return to stock i in month t. , 1 it R  , ,1 it size  and ,1 it BM  are the return, book-to-market ratio and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month t-1 net of the month t-1 cross-sectional mean. 52wkhWinneri,t-j(52wkhLoseri,t-j) is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of 1 if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% in month t-j. The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in month t-j-12 to t-j. IndMomWinneri,t-j (IndMomLoseri,t-j) is an industry momentum dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to short-term winning (losing) industries in month t-j. Short term winning and losing industries are defined the top and bottom three industries ranked on value-weighted 12-month industry average returns. 5-year winner (5-year loser) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i's past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t, and zero otherwise. 5-year winningIndi,t-j (5-year losing Indi,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and losing industry in month t-j. Long term winning and losing industry are defined as the top and bottom three industries ranked on value-weighted five-year average industry returns. The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are average over 1, 2,. size  are the return, book-to-market ratio and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month t-1 net of the month t-1 cross-sectional mean. 52wkhWinneri,t-j (52wkhLoseri,t-j) is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in month t-j-12 to t-j. IndMomWinneri,t-j(IndMomLoseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to short-term winning (losing) industries in month t-j, and zero otherwise. Short term winning and losing industries are defined the top and bottom 3 industries ranked on 12-month value-weighted average industry returns. 5-year winneri,t-j (5-year loseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i's past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise.
,
Neutral  is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a stock i is neither five-year losers nor five-year winners in month t-j, and zero otherwise. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) size  are the return, book-to-market ratio and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month t-1 net of the month t-1 cross-sectional mean. 52wkhWinneri,t-j(52wkhLoseri,t-j) is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in month tj-12 to t-j. IndMomWinneri,t-j (IndMomLoseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to short-term winning (losing) industries in month t-j, and zero otherwise. Short term winning and losing industries are defined the top and bottom three industries ranked on 12-month value-weighted average industry returns. 5-year winneri,t-j (5-year loseri,tj) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i's past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise. Ind. 5-year winneri,t-j (Ind.
5-year loseri,t-j)
is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and losing industry in month t-j, and zero otherwise. Long term winning and losing industry are defined as the top and bottom three industries ranked on five-year value-weighted average industry returns. year Loser  ) is a dummy variable that takes value of one if a stock i's industry adjusted five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The industry adjusted five-year return is calculated as the stock's own five-year return minus the value-weighed five-year return for the industry to which the stock belongs. Conversely, we re-define winning and losing industries in terms of an excess stock return. All stocks are first placed into quintile portfolios according to the stock five-year performance measure. The excess stock return is a stock's five-year return minus the value-weighted five-year return of the quintile portfolio to which the stock belongs. For each industry, we then average the excess stock returns according to each stock's industry membership. We choose top and bottom three portfolios as new winning and losing industries based on each industry's excess stock returns. If a stock belongs to the new winning (losing) industries, the dummy size  are the return, book-to-market ratio and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month t-1 net of the month t-1 cross-sectional mean. 52wkhWinneri,t-j(52wkhLoseri,t-j) is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in month tj-12 to t-j. IndMomWinneri,t-j(IndMomLoseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to short-term winning (losing) industries in month t-j, and zero otherwise. Short term winning and losing industries are defined the top and bottom three industries ranked on 12-month value-weighted average industry returns, respectively. 5-year winneri,t-j (5-year loseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i's past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise. 5-year winning Indi,t-j ( 5-year losing Indi,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and losing industry in month t-j, and zero otherwise. Long term winning and losing industry are defined as the top and bottom three industries ranked on five-year value-weighted average industry returns. Long term industry contrarian performance is measured by buying stocks in losing industries and selling those in winning industries (e.g. ) in month t-j. The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are average over 1, 2,...,12 j  for column labelled (1, 12), 13,14,..., 24 j  for column (13, 24)… and 1, 2,...,60 j  for columns labelled (1, 60). To obtain risk-adjusted returns, we run time series averages (one for each average), which are computed from the cross-sectional regressions, on the Fama-French (1996) three-factor model in Panel A. We also run the averages on the Fama-French (2015) five-factor model, including two additional factors (the profitability factor and the asset growth factor) and the intercepts from the time-series regression is reported in Panel B. The numbers in the table are in percentage per month. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Table 7 The Sharpe ratio Panel A reports the monthly Sharpe ratio for each individual factor and long term contrarian performance for stocks and industries. 5-year Ind. is industry contrarian performance by longing in stocks in losing industries and shorting in stocks in winning industries. 5-year stock is stock contrarian performance by longing in loser stocks and shorting in winner stocks. The two types of contrarian performance are estimated by the previous cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions. The Sharpe ratio is calculated as the ratio of the mean return to its standard deviation for each factor and type of contrarian performance. MKT, SMB and HML stands for the market, the size and the value factors in Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. 5F_SMB, 5F_HML, 5F_ROE and 5F_INV are the size, the value, the profitability and the investment factors in Fama-French (2015) five-factor model. Panel B reports the maximum monthly Sharpe ratio achievable from each factor model (i.e. the three-factor model and the five-factor model) and each type of contrarian performance. The maximum Sharpe ratio is calculated as Sloan (1996) . Industry IVOL is the standard deviation of the residuals from regressing daily industry portfolio returns on daily FTSE All index return (the market return) from July of the last year to June of the current year. We measure industry concentration using the Herfindahl index. According to each stock's industry membership, the number of analysts is aggregated in a given industry and then is divided by the total number of firms in the industry. The sample 20 industries are separated into the top (bottom) 10 industries according to one of the four measures. We then re-run the Fama-MacBeth regressions for the two groups to obtain raw returns. By using the Fama-French three-factor (FF3) and five-factor (FF5) models, we obtain risk-adjusted returns for each portfolio. 
